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CVE-2023-52828bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as seen. The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted as the final instruction in the program. An example of such a program would be this: do_something(): ... r0 = 0 exit foo(): r1 = 0 call bpf_throw r0 = 0 exit bar(cond): if r1 != 0 goto pc+2 call do_something exit call foo r0 = 0 // Never seen by verifier exit // main(ctx): r1 = ... call bar r0 = 0 exit Here, if we do end up throwing, the stacktrace would be the following: bpf_throw foo bar main In bar, the final instruction emitted will be the call to foo, as such, the return address will be the subsequent instruction (which the JIT emits as int3 on x86). This will end up lying outside the jited_len of the program, thus, when unwinding, we will fail to discover the return address as belonging to any program and end up in a panic due to the unreliable stack unwinding of BPF programs that we never expect. To remedy this case, make bpf_prog_ksym_find treat IP == ksym.end as part of the BPF program, so that is_bpf_text_address returns true when such a case occurs, and we are able to unwind reliably when the final instruction ends up being a call instruction.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By Linux

  2. Published

  3. · 24 months later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2023-52828, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
CISA-ADPADP (enrichment)3.1Medium6.6CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
NVDNVD · Analyzed3.1Medium5.5CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.25% · top 84% of all CVEs (12 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Medium 6.6.

Affected products

  • Linux · Linux

    • affected 74451e66d516c55e309e8d89a4a1e7596e46aacd – < 6058e4829696412457729a00734969acc6fd1d18
    • affected 74451e66d516c55e309e8d89a4a1e7596e46aacd – < cf353904a82873e952633fcac4385c2fcd3a46e1
    • affected 74451e66d516c55e309e8d89a4a1e7596e46aacd – < aa42a7cb92647786719fe9608685da345883878f
    • affected 74451e66d516c55e309e8d89a4a1e7596e46aacd – < 327b92e8cb527ae097961ffd1610c720481947f5
    • affected 74451e66d516c55e309e8d89a4a1e7596e46aacd – < 821a7e4143af115b840ec199eb179537e18af922
    • affected 74451e66d516c55e309e8d89a4a1e7596e46aacd – < 66d9111f3517f85ef2af0337ece02683ce0faf21
  • Linux · Linux

    • affected 4.11
    • unaffected < 4.11
    • unaffected 5.10.202 – ≤ 5.10.*
    • unaffected 5.15.140 – ≤ 5.15.*
    • unaffected 6.1.64 – ≤ 6.1.*
    • unaffected 6.5.13 – ≤ 6.5.*
    • unaffected 6.6.3 – ≤ 6.6.*
    • unaffected 6.7 – ≤ *

References

References6

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .