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CVE-2024-39483KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger in bare metal (though still small). That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed simultaneous NMIs with GIF=0 for over a decade, since commit 7460fb4a3400 ("KVM: Fix simultaneous NMIs"). I.e. KVM's GIF=0 handling shouldn't be modified without a *really* good reason to do so, and if KVM's behavior were to be modified, it should be done irrespective of vNMI support.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By Linux

  2. · 10 days later

    Published

  3. · 2 years later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2024-39483, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
LinuxCNA (assigner)3.1High7.1CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
NVDNVD · Modified3.1Medium5.5CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.22% · top 87% of all CVEs (18 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 7.1.

Affected products

  • Linux · Linux

    • affected fa4c027a7956f5e07697bfcb580d25eeb8471257 – < f79edaf7370986d73d204b36c50cc563a4c0f356
    • affected fa4c027a7956f5e07697bfcb580d25eeb8471257 – < 1d87cf2eba46deaff6142366127f2323de9f84d1
    • affected fa4c027a7956f5e07697bfcb580d25eeb8471257 – < b4bd556467477420ee3a91fbcba73c579669edc6
  • Linux · Linux

    • affected 6.4
    • unaffected < 6.4
    • unaffected 6.6.34 – ≤ 6.6.*
    • unaffected 6.9.5 – ≤ 6.9.*
    • unaffected 6.10 – ≤ *

References

References3

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .