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CVE-2025-13911Inductive Automation Ignition Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

Description

Ignition by Inductive Automation, when installed with default OS service account settings, may expose the host system to an elevated code execution risk via the gateway backup restore functionality. An authenticated user with Gateway Administrator privileges can import a malicious gateway backup (.gwbk) file containing crafted project resources, scripts, or modules, resulting in code execution on the host system. This affects both Windows and Linux installations. On Windows, default installations often run the Ignition service as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, resulting in code execution with full local system privileges. On Linux, default installations commonly run the Ignition service as root or with elevated privileges. Specific privilege level depends on installation configuration.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By icscert

  2. · 16 days later

    Published

  3. · 8 months later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2025-13911, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
icscertCNA (assigner)4.0High7.3CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
icscertCNA (assigner)3.1Medium6.4CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVDNVD · Deferred4.0High7.3CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.26% · top 82% of all CVEs (19 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 7.3.

Affected products

What to do

Workaround: Inductive Automation encourages users to do the following in order to reduce the risk of this vulnerability: * Create a new dedicated local Windows account that will be used exclusively for the Ignition service (e.g. svc-ign) (this should not be a domain account). * Remove all group memberships from the service account (including Users and Administrators). * Add to security policy to log in as a service. * Add to “Deny log on locally” security policy. * Provide full read/write access only to the Ignition installation directory for the service account created in step 1. * Add read/write permissions to other directories in the local filesystem as needed (e.g: if configured to use optional Enterprise Administration Module to write automated backups to the file system). * Set deny access settings for service account on other directories not needed by the Ignition service. * Specifically the C:\Windows, C:\Users, and directories for any other applications in the Program Files or Program Files (x86) directories. * Use java param to change temp directory to a location within the Ignition install directory so the Users folder can be denied access to the Ignition service account. * Restrict project imports to verified and trusted sources only, ideally using checksums or digital signatures. * Use multiple environments (e.g. Dev, Test, Prod) with a staging workflow so that new data is never introduced directly to Production environments. See Ignition Deployment Best Practices. * When feasible, segment or isolate Ignition gateways from corporate resources and Windows Domains. * The Ignition service account or AD server object should never need Windows Domain or Windows Active Directory privileges. This would only be needed if an Asset Owners IT or OT department uses this for management outside Ignition. * Ignition may be federated with Active Directory environments (e.g. OT domains) by entering “Authentication Profile” credentials within the Ignition gateway itself. This could use secure LDAP, SAML, or OpenID Connect. * When feasible, enforce strong credential management and MFA for all users with Designer permissions (8.1.x and 8.3.x), Config Page permissions (8.1.x), and Config Write permissions (8.3.x). * When feasible, deploy Ignition within hardened or containerized environments.

Workaround: Mitigation guidance covering OS-level service account hardening for both Windows and Linux is available in Annex A of the Ignition Security Hardening Guide. Application-level controls under a default installation are in development.

Workaround: For more information and updates, users should refer to Inductive Automation's Trust Portal https://security.inductiveautomation.com .

References

References3

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .