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CVE-2026-105963Secret key base exposed in stack trace arguments on wrong-typed Plug.Crypto arguments

Description

Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in plug_crypto in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in Plug.Crypto validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise FunctionClauseError with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library's rescue blocks and Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1 only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as crash_reason Logger metadata, which error trackers forward. Two entry points take request data. Plug.Crypto.verify/4 exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which Phoenix.Token.verify/4 reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker. This issue affects plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1; plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By EEF

  2. · 17 days later

    Published

  3. · 27 days later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-105963, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
EEFCNA (assigner)4.0Medium5.1CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
NVDNVD · Deferred4.0Medium5.1CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.51% · top 56% of all CVEs (19 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Medium 5.1.

Affected products

What to do

Workaround: Check argument types in the calling code before entering Plug.Crypto, so no head guard ever fails. Pass a token to Phoenix.Token.verify/4, Phoenix.Token.decrypt/4, Plug.Crypto.verify/4 or Plug.Crypto.decrypt/4 only when is_binary(token) holds, and treat anything else as an invalid token. Call Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 only when both operands are binaries, treating a missing header or parameter as a failed comparison rather than passing nil. Where the leaked value matters more than the crash, configuring the error tracker to drop stack-frame arguments also keeps the secret out of the forwarded report. For Sentry this means not sending vars with the crash report. This narrows exposure but leaves the value in the local error log.

References

References7

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .