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CVE-2026-16460Bootc: ostree: bootc/ostree: staged deployments not revalidated against container signature policy before finalization

Description

A flaw was found in bootc and ostree. Already-staged deployments are finalized without revalidating the deployment's container image against the current containers signature policy. Unsigned OS content staged under a prior permissive policy can remain bootable after policy is hardened to reject unsigned images, leading to full host compromise on reboot.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By redhat

  2. · 3 months later

    Published

  3. · 16 days later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-16460, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
redhatCNA (assigner)3.1High7.4CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVDNVD · Awaiting Analysis3.1High7.4CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.10% · top 99% of all CVEs (17 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 7.4.

Affected products

What to do

Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to revalidate container image signatures against active container signature policy before finalizing or booting staged ostree deployments in bootc and ostree: upgrade to the fixed Bootc/Ostree/Rpm Ostree/Rust Zincati builds, which revalidates container image signatures against the active container signature policy in /etc/containers/policy.json before finalizing or booting already-staged ostree deployments, closing all 2 injection vectors (host reboot into pending staged deployment, bootc upgrade --from-downloaded deployment application). Until patched, this is only a concern on Linux systems using bootc or ostree, including RHEL image-mode hosts — Non-Linux platforms are unaffected — so Clear all existing staged ostree deployments immediately after hardening /etc/containers/policy.json and ensure unsigned container images are never staged. As a compensating measure, Run SELinux in enforcing mode to confine processes running from finalized deployments to defined domains and Deploy IMA/EVM appraisal to verify executable file signatures at runtime and block untrusted binaries. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying missing signature revalidation defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-712 Container Image Signing and Provenance Verification (Cosign/Sigstore) (high)

References

References2

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .