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CVE-2026-16671Out-of-bounds stack write in MCUboot split-image validation with SHA-384/SHA-512 builds

Description

split_image_check() in boot/bootutil/src/loader.c declares a fixed uint8_t loader_hash[32] buffer and passes it as the out_hash out-parameter to bootutil_img_validate(). That routine copies IMAGE_HASH_SIZE bytes into out_hash (memcpy(out_hash, hash, IMAGE_HASH_SIZE) in boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c), where IMAGE_HASH_SIZE is a compile-time constant of 64 for MCUBOOT_SHA512 or 48 for MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384/SHA-384 (boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/sha.h). The buffer tracks SHA-256 (32 bytes) while the copy length tracks the configured algorithm, so the write overruns the buffer by 16 or 32 bytes. The overflow is only present in a non-default configuration: the legacy Mynewt split-image feature must be compiled (split_go()/split_image_check(), i.e. neither MCUBOOT_DIRECT_XIP nor MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD), the digest must be larger than 32 bytes (MCUBOOT_SHA512 or MCUBOOT_SIGN_EC384), and MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE must be off. split_go() is a public API with no caller inside MCUboot; it is invoked from a Mynewt application. In the default SHA-256 build there is no overflow. The over-written bytes are the one-way digest of the loader image and the overflow length is fixed at build time, so the contents are not meaningfully attacker-controlled and the size is not attacker-chosen. The realistic impact is bounded, uncontrolled corruption of the bootloader's stack on the split-boot path, manifesting as instability or failed boot in the affected configuration rather than reliable code execution. The fix is to size loader_hash to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE and pass IMAGE_HASH_SIZE as the matching seed length.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By zephyr

  2. · 4 months later

    Published

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-16671, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
zephyrCNA (assigner)3.1Low2.9CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
NVDNVD · Awaiting Analysis3.1Low2.9CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.11% · top 99% of all CVEs (15 Nov 2026)
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The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Low 2.9.

Affected products

References

References2

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .