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CVE-2026-17039Pki-core: dogtag-pki: redhat-pki: pki-core: ca renewal request processing omits realm authorization check performed by enrollment path

Description

A flaw was found in pki-core. The certificate authority (CA) renewal request path does not perform the realm-based authorization check that the enrollment path performs, allowing an authenticated user entitled to one realm to cause a certificate belonging to a different realm to be renewed without that realm's authorization.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By redhat

  2. Published

  3. · 4 months later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-17039, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
redhatCNA (assigner)3.1Low3.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
NVDNVD · Awaiting Analysis3.1Low3.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.26% · top 82% of all CVEs (16 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Low 3.1.

Affected products

What to do

Workaround: Deployments that do not configure a realm-mapped authorization manager (AuthzRealmDefault with a non-default realm-to-authorization-manager mapping) for multi-tenant or delegated sub-CA use are not exposed to this issue. For deployments that do use realm-based authorization, using a renewal profile that additionally restricts renewal requests to the original requester narrows exposure: the shipped caDirUserRenewal.cfg profile configures authz.acl=user_origreq="auth_token.uid", which independently blocks cross-user renewal by comparing the renewing caller's UID against the UID that submitted the original request. This is a partial mitigation only -- it is realm-blind rather than realm-aware, so a UID collision across two independently-administered realms' user directories would still bypass it -- and it does not apply to caManualRenewal.cfg or other shipped renewal profiles that configure no authz.acl, which remain exploitable as described. No complete mitigation is available; apply the update once released.

References

References8

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .