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CVE-2026-53431Boruta accepts expired JWT client assertions due to missing exp claim validation

Description

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authenticate as the issuing OAuth client after the assertion has expired. Boruta accepts JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt token endpoint authentication methods) but never enforces that the assertion's exp claim is in the future. The pre-check helper Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check_expiration/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex only verifies that an exp claim is present (it pattern-matches on the existence of the key and returns success), and the Joken token configuration used for signature verification, Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token_config/0 in lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex, returns an empty map, so Joken's default exp claim validator is not engaged either. Any attacker who obtains a validly-signed client assertion (for example through logs, reverse proxies, browser tooling, or other observability surfaces) can replay it indefinitely to authenticate as the client and obtain access tokens with that client's privileges. This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7.

Public exploit

An exploit or proof of concept is public: anyone can try it against an unpatched system. A reference of the record is tagged as an exploit. CISA's SSVC rates its exploitation: a proof of concept is public.

Show the exploits1

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By EEF

  2. · 51 days later

    Published

  3. · 1 day later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-53431, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
EEFCNA (assigner)4.0Critical9.1CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
NVDNVD · Deferred4.0Critical9.1CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.51% · top 56% of all CVEs (18 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Critical 9.1.

Affected products

What to do

Workaround: Restrict the use of JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt) to highly trusted clients, and prefer non-JWT client authentication methods (client_secret_basic or client_secret_post) where possible. Where JWT client authentication must remain enabled, issue short-lived client assertions and protect them from exposure in application logs, fronting proxies, browser tooling, and observability systems to reduce the window for replay.

References

References5

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .