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CVE-2026-63888scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd() Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"): 1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in). text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf(): if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) { ... rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN; } ... if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) { data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL); iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C. Fix by passing the actual padded payload length (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc(). 2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest drop. On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap: kfree(text_in); return 0; cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which unconditionally does kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr); cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL; freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives. On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after login produces two back-to-back splats: BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x?? BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x?? showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts the slab freelist. Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4 less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together. Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and the wire protocol is unaffected.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By Linux

  2. Published

  3. · 3 months later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-63888, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
LinuxCNA (assigner)3.1Critical9.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVDNVD · Analyzed3.1Critical9.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.78% · top 43% of all CVEs (20 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Critical 9.8.

Affected products

  • Linux · Linux

    • affected e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 – < f7948af0dd03de84079dcd4dc215a69fd6fbb95d
    • affected e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 – < badf178b76b0690851df00f4ca9cf2eb8eb0f963
    • affected e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 – < 6e22a1cdcc8277af4acc43710577157b77a02c5d
    • affected e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 – < d3e9b79aa794f7a23e82de4d710e7d2df610e349
    • affected e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 – < ec9f19d52074a191ed1756ed4a7d39fff1a2085c
    • affected e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 – < 89c81d1228c00fa6dd91de6c1c5aa1ef8a7875e3
    • affected e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 – < 5118ea225fe63b44207ba88047e4866e1ea43812
    • affected e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 – < 778c2ab142c625a8a8afa570e0f9b7873f445d99
  • Linux · Linux

    • affected 3.1
    • unaffected < 3.1
    • unaffected 5.10.259 – ≤ 5.10.*
    • unaffected 5.15.210 – ≤ 5.15.*
    • unaffected 6.1.176 – ≤ 6.1.*
    • unaffected 6.6.143 – ≤ 6.6.*
    • unaffected 6.12.93 – ≤ 6.12.*
    • unaffected 6.18.35 – ≤ 6.18.*
    • unaffected 7.0.12 – ≤ 7.0.*
    • unaffected 7.1 – ≤ *

References

References8

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .