CVE-2026-64586wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal
- 8.8HighCVSS base score
- 0.25%Exploitation in 30 daysEPSS · top 83% of all CVEs
- NoKnown exploitednot in CISA's KEV catalog
- NonePublic exploitsnone known yet
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -> brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock; resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe. Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr (bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate. The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit), SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released those DMA buffers. This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
Timeline
ID reserved
By Linux
- 18 days later
· 18 days later
Published
- 2 months later
· 2 months later
Record updated
Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.
Scores
| Scored by | CVSS | Score | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| LinuxCNA (assigner) | 3.1 | High8.8 | CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| NVDNVD · Received | 3.1 | High8.8 | CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
- EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
- 0.25% · top 83% of all CVEs (15 Nov 2026)
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 8.8.
Affected products
- affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 – < 9dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da
- affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 – < 4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dc
- affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 – < 61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54fac
- affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 – < c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7
- affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 – < e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683
- affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 – < 02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e
- affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 – < 177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985
- affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 – < 43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945
- affected 5.2
- unaffected < 5.2
- unaffected 5.10.266 – ≤ 5.10.*
- unaffected 5.15.217 – ≤ 5.15.*
- unaffected 6.1.184 – ≤ 6.1.*
- unaffected 6.6.151 – ≤ 6.6.*
- unaffected 6.12.103 – ≤ 6.12.*
- unaffected 6.18.44 – ≤ 6.18.*
- unaffected 7.1.6 – ≤ 7.1.*
- unaffected 7.2 – ≤ *
References
References8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da (opens in a new tab)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dc (opens in a new tab)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54fac (opens in a new tab)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7 (opens in a new tab)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683 (opens in a new tab)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e (opens in a new tab)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985 (opens in a new tab)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945 (opens in a new tab)
Sources
The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.
- CVE.org record (opens in a new tab)
- CVE List JSON (GitHub) (opens in a new tab)
- NVD (opens in a new tab)
- FIRST EPSS (opens in a new tab)
- EUVD EUVD-2026-53773 (opens in a new tab)
- OSV.dev (opens in a new tab)
- GitHub Advisories (opens in a new tab)
- CIRCL Vulnerability-Lookup (opens in a new tab)
Badge for a README or a ticket
[](https://cveledger.app/cve/CVE-2026-64586)Record last updated .