Skip to content
CVE Ledger
  • Newest CVEsPage
  • Recently added to KEVPage
  • Rising exploitation (EPSS)Page
  • Weekly digestPage
  • StatisticsPage
  • WatchlistPage
  • API docsPage
  • MCP serverPage
  • AboutPage
  • Data sourcesPage
  • Data statusPage
  • ChangelogPage
  • How it's builtPage
  • Support the projectPage

14 results

Back

CVE-2026-66295Processing instruction target and content emitted unescaped in Saxy encoder allows XML injection

Description

Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it. Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction. The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By EEF

  2. · 4 months later

    Published

  3. · 4 days later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-66295, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
EEFCNA (assigner)4.0Low2.1CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
NVDNVD · Deferred4.0Low2.1CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.17% · top 94% of all CVEs (17 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Low 2.1.

Affected products

  • qcam · saxy

    • affected 0.7.0 – < 1.7.0
  • qcam · saxy

    • affected 7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690 – < 4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0

What to do

Workaround: Do not place untrusted data in processing instructions. Where a dynamic value is unavoidable, validate it before building the node: reject any content containing ?>, and reject any target that does not match the XML Name production or that equals xml case-insensitively. Alternatively, carry the value in element content or an attribute instead, both of which the encoder escapes.

References

References5

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

Badge for a README or a ticket

CVE-2026-66295 badge
[![CVE-2026-66295](https://cveledger.app/badge/CVE-2026-66295.svg)](https://cveledger.app/cve/CVE-2026-66295)

Record last updated .