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CVE-2026-75085Out-of-bounds read from received-frame length underflow in the STM32WBA IEEE 802.15.4 driver

Description

The STM32WBA IEEE 802.15.4 driver in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_stm32wba.c computed the packet length of a received frame as pkt_len = rx_frame->length - IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH without first checking that the radio-reported length could hold an FCS. pkt_len is a uint8_t, so a reported length of 0 or 1 wrapped to 254 or 255. The only bound on the resulting value was __ASSERT_NO_MSG(pkt_len <= CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE), which compiles to nothing in the default production configuration (CONFIG_ASSERT=n). The length originates in the ST link-layer receive-done metadata (p_metadata->length, stored by stm32wba_802154_receive_done()), and ultimately in the PHY header of a frame received over the air, so it is influenced by any attacker within radio range of the device. Reaching the underflow requires the vendor link layer to surface a frame shorter than the FCS with no error; the driver performed no validation of its own on that value. When the underflow occurs, stm32wba_802154_rx_thread() calls net_pkt_write(pkt, rx_frame->psdu, pkt_len) with a length of about 254 bytes against a receive buffer that holds at most one PHY packet (IEEE802154_MAX_PHY_PACKET_SIZE, 127 bytes). This reads roughly 128 bytes past the end of the radio receive buffer and copies that adjacent memory into a network packet that is submitted to the networking stack, giving an out-of-bounds read with a potential disclosure of adjacent RAM plus needless oversized packet allocation in the RX thread. The fix rejects a frame whose reported length is smaller than IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH before the subtraction, and replaces the compiled-out assertion with a runtime length check that drops oversized frames — matching the runtime check already present in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_nrf5.c.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By zephyr

  2. · 58 days later

    Published

  3. · 21 days later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-75085, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
zephyrCNA (assigner)3.1Medium4.2CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
NVDNVD · Awaiting Analysis3.1Medium4.2CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.21% · top 89% of all CVEs (18 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Medium 4.2.

Affected products

References

References2

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .