Skip to content
CVE Ledger
  • Newest CVEsPage
  • Recently added to KEVPage
  • Rising exploitation (EPSS)Page
  • Weekly digestPage
  • StatisticsPage
  • WatchlistPage
  • API docsPage
  • MCP serverPage
  • AboutPage
  • Data sourcesPage
  • Data statusPage
  • ChangelogPage
  • How it's builtPage
  • Support the projectPage

14 results

Back

CVE-2026-82390Cross-session AES key confusion in the Espressif ESP32 hardware crypto driver

Description

The Espressif AES driver drivers/crypto/crypto_esp32_aes.c advertises a multi-session cipher API — it hands out up to CONFIG_ESP32_CRYPTO_AES_SESSIONS_MAX (default 4) independent sessions, each carrying its own key and direction. The AES peripheral, however, has a single chip-global set of key and mode registers, and aes_begin_session() programmed them exactly once, at session start, outside the aes_lock mutex that serialises the transforms. The per-operation handlers aes_ecb_op(), aes_cbc_op() and aes_ctr_op() then ran aes_hal_transform_block() against whatever key and direction the registers happened to hold. As a result, once a second session is opened with a different key, every subsequent operation on the first session silently uses the second session's key and direction, and no error is reported. Because the key programming happened outside the lock, the correct usage pattern of "each thread does begin, then op, then free on its own session" also races: a second thread's cipher_begin_session() landing between the first thread's begin and its operation makes that operation run under the second thread's key. An attacker who can induce session creation on the device — for example a protocol peer whose connection causes a session key to be installed — can influence which key is resident when a victim operation runs. The impact is a cryptographic failure rather than memory corruption: data the application believed it was protecting under one key is encrypted or decrypted under another. Where the resident key is one the attacker knows or supplied, the affected plaintext becomes recoverable by that attacker, and the operation's direction (encrypt versus decrypt) can likewise be inverted. Exposure requires an application that holds two or more concurrent sessions with different keys against this driver; no in-tree Zephyr subsystem does so today (the 802.15.4 security layer, which does open two sessions, uses CCM mode, which this driver rejects), so the risk falls on application code that uses the documented multi-session API. The fix removes all hardware access from aes_begin_session() and reprograms the key and direction at the top of every operation, inside aes_lock, so the chip-global registers can no longer be observed stale by another session.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By zephyr

  2. · 59 days later

    Published

  3. · 9 days later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-82390, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
zephyrCNA (assigner)3.1Low3.7CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
NVDNVD · Awaiting Analysis3.1Low3.7CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.20% · top 90% of all CVEs (18 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Low 3.7.

Affected products

References

References2

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

Badge for a README or a ticket

CVE-2026-82390 badge
[![CVE-2026-82390](https://cveledger.app/badge/CVE-2026-82390.svg)](https://cveledger.app/cve/CVE-2026-82390)

Record last updated .