Skip to content
CVE Ledger
  • Newest CVEsPage
  • Recently added to KEVPage
  • Rising exploitation (EPSS)Page
  • Weekly digestPage
  • StatisticsPage
  • WatchlistPage
  • API docsPage
  • MCP serverPage
  • AboutPage
  • Data sourcesPage
  • Data statusPage
  • ChangelogPage
  • How it's builtPage
  • Support the projectPage

14 results

Back

CVE-2026-86404Artemis-server: artemis-jms-client: artemis-core-client: undertow-core: wildfly-messaging-activemq-subsystem: artemis messaging handlers in red hat eap permit deserialization by default

Description

EAP's Artemis deserialization configuration permits deserialization by default. ObjectMessage.getObject() uses ObjectInputStreamWithClassLoader, which implements allow-list/block-list filtering via its checkSecurity()/isTrustedType() method. However, by default both allow-list and block-list are empty. When the allow-list is empty (size == 0), isTrustedType() returns true for ALL classes. This means all classes are deserializable by default.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By redhat

  2. Published

  3. · 55 days later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-86404, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
redhatCNA (assigner)3.1High8.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVDNVD · Awaiting Analysis3.1High8.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.70% · top 46% of all CVEs (13 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 8.8.

Affected products

What to do

Workaround: Configure a restrictive deserialization-allow-list on every pooled-connection-factory resource. For example, if your MDBs only expect to receive objects of type com.yourapp.OrderEvent, set the allow-list to "com.yourapp". This switches ObjectInputStreamWithClassLoader from "allow everything" to "deny by default, allow only listed classes." With this in place, even if an attacker injects a malicious ObjectMessage through any vector, the deserialization of gadget chain classes is blocked.

References

References6

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

Badge for a README or a ticket

CVE-2026-86404 badge
[![CVE-2026-86404](https://cveledger.app/badge/CVE-2026-86404.svg)](https://cveledger.app/cve/CVE-2026-86404)

Record last updated .