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CVE-2026-87039I2S configure syscall handler passes an unvalidated user-supplied kernel object pointer to drivers

Description

The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_i2s_configure() in drivers/i2s/i2s_handlers.c copies the caller's struct i2s_config in from user memory and then, when cfg->frame_clk_freq is 0 (the API's "unconfigure the stream" request), jumps straight to z_impl_i2s_configure() without performing the K_SYSCALL_OBJ(config.mem_slab, K_OBJ_MEM_SLAB) ownership/type check or the block_size sanity check. The mem_slab field is a struct k_mem_slab *, so on that path a completely unvalidated, user-chosen pointer reaches driver code that is entitled to trust it as a real kernel object. Any thread running under CONFIG_USERSPACE that has access to an I2S device object can trigger this with a single i2s_configure() call. Most in-tree drivers special-case frame_clk_freq == 0 and never store the caller's structure, but drivers/i2s/i2s_litex.c does not: i2s_litex_configure() only logs a warning for a mismatched frame clock, then memcpy()s the caller's config into stream->cfg and marks the stream I2S_STATE_READY. A subsequent i2s_trigger() with I2S_TRIGGER_START enables the FIFO interrupt, and the interrupt handlers i2s_litex_isr_rx() / i2s_litex_isr_tx() then call k_mem_slab_alloc() and k_mem_slab_free() on the attacker-supplied pointer in supervisor context. The result is an arbitrary-pointer read/write primitive executed by the kernel on behalf of an unprivileged thread — k_mem_slab_alloc() takes a spinlock at slab->lock and reads and writes slab->free_list and the link word inside the returned "block" — which defeats the CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation boundary entirely. The same missing validation is a hazard for out-of-tree I2S drivers that retain the configuration on the unconfigure path. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are unaffected, since the verifier is not used. The fix zeroes config.mem_slab and config.block_size on the unconfigure path so the driver can never receive an unvalidated pointer, while still allowing a stream to be unconfigured by a caller that does not own a memory slab, as the API documents.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By zephyr

  2. · 57 days later

    Published

  3. · 5 days later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-87039, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
zephyrCNA (assigner)3.1High7.8CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVDNVD · Awaiting Analysis3.1High7.8CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.10% · top 99% of all CVEs (19 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: High 7.8.

Affected products

References

References2

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .