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CVE-2026-91012Apache Karaf: Path Traversal in Config Service Allows Manager-to-Admin Privilege Escalation

Description

org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties), which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}: * if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to; * otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias. Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container. ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.

Timeline

  1. ID reserved

    By apache

  2. · 15 days later

    Published

  3. · 2 days later

    Record updated

Changes after publication (a new score, a public exploit, EPSS crossing 1, 10 or 50 %, leaving KEV) are kept since November 2026; earlier ones are not known.

Scores

CVSS scores of CVE-2026-91012, by who scored it
Scored byCVSSScoreVector
CISA-ADPADP (enrichment)3.1Critical9.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVDNVD · Analyzed3.1Critical9.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS (exploitation in 30 days)
0.63% · top 49% of all CVEs (16 Nov 2026)
CISA SSVC
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total
Loading the EPSS history…

The list uses the assigner's score when there is one, then CISA's, then NVD's: Critical 9.8.

Affected products

References

References2

Sources

The same CVE in the primary databases and aggregators, to check against.

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Record last updated .